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PERCHANCE TO DREAM: THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY A·ND THE
AMERICAN DREAM
MICHAEL

I.

S. KNOLL*

THE LEGACY OF THE 1980s

In May 1992, South Central Los Angeles burst into flames.
Although the immediate cause of that disturbance was the acquittal of
the four white police officers accused of beating black motorist Rodney
King, few would deny that the root causes of the riots extend far beyond
the Los Angeles criminal justice system. Economic frustration is often
identified as the underlying cause, although U.S. social and racial policies
are also frequently identified. 1 Of course, the economic frustrations that
were and continue to be felt in South Central Los Angeles are shared by
many nationwide. Many of the roots of these frustrations, however, are
international, extending to all comers of the globe from which U.S. businesses and workers face competition. 2
The integration of the United States into the global economy, commonly termed globalization, is occurring and is likely to continue for
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California. A.B. 1977, A.M. 1980,
Ph.D. 1983, J.D. 1984, University of Chicago. Dick Craswell, Eric Claeys, Ron Garet, Morris Morkre, Chris Stone, and Therese Tuttle provided valuable suggestions. Kenny Gersh assisted with the
research, and I presented the paper to faculty and research assistants at U.S.C. Thanks to all. Copyright 1993 by Michael S. Knoll. All rights reserved.
1. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fire This Time, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571 (1993); Paul
Hoffman, The Feds. Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling
Police Abuse in America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1462-71 (1993); Lisa C. lkemoto, Traces of the
Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed
"Los Angeles." 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993); Leonard J. Long, A Problem of the Heart: Few Feel
for the Poor, 66 S. CAL. L. REV 1317 (1993); Angela E. Ob, Race Relations in Los Angeles: Divide
and Conquer is Flourishing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1647 (1993).
2. The car that Rodney King was driving at the time, a Hyundai, was manufactured in South
Korea. See Hector Tobar & Richard Lee Colvin, Witnesses Depict Relentless Beating, L.A. TIMES.
Mar. 7, 1991, at Bl.
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some time before eventually levelling off. 3 Although the received wisdom has been that the rising tide of economic growth from globalization
will raise the incomes of the rich, the middle class, and the poor, evidence from the 1980s contradicts this belief. A consensus has emerged
that over the previous decade the incomes of the more-educated and
richer segment of the U.S. population rose and those of the less-educated
and poorer segment fell. 4 Although there remain many unresolved issues
in understanding the causes of the increase in U.S. inequality over the
1980s, that increase is well-established.' This Essay describes the role
globalization plays in increasing U.S. inequality. Building on that foundation, I describe how the advent of the global economy exacerbates conflicts in U.S. society and the consequences of globalization for several
cherished American beliefs.
II.

CURRENTS IN U.S. ECONOMIC HISTORY

Since colonial times the United States has had a high standard of
living. Of course, by definition, the wealthy enjoy a higher standard of
living than the rest of society. What is noteworthy about the history of
U.S. living standards, however, is that in comparison to the rest of the
world, it is not the American rich but the American middle class and
poor that have benefitted most from the high standard of living. That is,
the standard of living of the American middle class and working poor,
relative to the standard of living of their foreign counterparts, is higher
than the same ratio for the rich. 6
3. President Clinton has not embraced protectionism. See The Global Economy: Who Gets
Hurt, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 10, 1992, at 48, 50.
4. See Marvin H. Kosten, Wages and Demographics, in WoRKERS AND THEIR WAGES 1 l,
Table 1-2 (Marvin H. Kosters ed., 1991); FRANK LEVY & RICHARD MICHEL, THE EcONOMIC
FuTURE OF AMERICAN FAMILIES: INCOME AND WEALTH TRENDS (1991); Kevin Murphy & Finis
Welch, The Role of International Trade in Wage Differentials, in WoRKERS AND THEIR. WAGES 39
(Marvin H. Kosters ed., 1991); ALICE RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE EcONOMY,
THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT (1993).
There is substantial disagreement over the magnitude of the increase in inequality. The problem is complicated because of the large influx of new entrants to the workforce and changing family
composition. Compare Paul Krugman, Like it or Not, The Income Gap Yawns, WALL ST. J., May
21, 1992, at A13; with On Keeping the Record Straight, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1992, at Al2. Commentators also disagree on the significance of the increase in inequality, especially over the distribution of gains from recent economic growth. Compare Paul Krugman, supra, with Michael Boskin,
Boskin on Krugman, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1992 at A7. Finally, there is a heated debate over the
effect of conservative domestic policies on income inequality. Compare Krugman, supra, with Boskin, supra.
S. Frank Levy & Richard Murnane, U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review
of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations, 30 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1333, 1372-73 (1992).
6. Susan Dentzer, The Wealth of Nations, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 4, 1992, at 54,
54. However, by 1980 the United States had a greater percentage of its population living in poverty

S

1993]

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

1601
I

From colonial times the New World provided (free) working men
and women with a good living. For many, what America offered was not
so much the opportunity to strike it rich, as in the stories of Horatio
Alger7 but a higher standard of living for the common worker than could
be attained in his or her native land. The source of this wealth at first
was the abundance of natural resources, most notably arable land.
Although capital was limited in the colonies, land was virtually unlimited and, when combined with labor, produced a wide variety of agricultural products. Because farmers in much of Europe and Asia had lower
quality land and less of it, labor was less productive there than in the
New World. This higher level of productivity led to a higher wage rate
and standard of living and encouraged many Asians and Europeans to
make the long, hard journey to the New World. 8
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In time the United States evolved from an agricultural economy into
an industrial one. In a manufacturing society, the relative abundance of
capital is a more important determinant of wages than is land. Throughout much of its history, the United States has sustained high rates of
capital formation for prolonged periods of time.9 With the exception of
the Civil War, the United States has avoided serious destruction of its
capital base. Thus, U.S. workers have had more capital with which to
work than did their foreign counterparts. However, of even greater
importance than the depth of the capital base are the level of technology
than did other modern industrial nations. John Coder et al., Inequality Among Children and Elderly
in Ten Motkm Nations: The United States in an International Context, 79 AM. EcoN. REv., PAPEJlS
AND PROCEEDINGS 320, 322-23 (1989).
7. See, e.g., HORATIO ALGER, JR.', RAGOED DICK; OR STREET LIFE IN NEW YORK WITH
THE BooTBLACKS (1868). In Ragged Dick, a poor shoeshine boy rises to wealth through hard work,
perseverance and honesty. This fonnula, which was repeated by Alger in scores of books during the
last third of the Nineteenth Century, came to be known as the "Alger hero," the fictional embodiment of the American rags-to-riches success story. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPEDIA
263 (1991). Of course, Alger's stories are fiction, but apparently so is the public image of Horatio
Alger as the popularizer of the American dream of financial success. A recent biography of Alger
argues that the heroes in Alger's books rarely rose to great wealth or power, more commonly attaining only middle-class respectability, and that the transformation of Alger into American mythmaker
occurred posthumously and for largely political reasons. GARY ScHARNHORST & JACK BALES, THE
LosT LIFE OF HORATIO ALGER, JR. 148-56 (1985).
8. See PAUL SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS 627 (lith ed. 1980). Economics teaches that labor in
unregulated markets is paid its marginal product. Moreover, the marginal product of labor is
higher, when there is a 8tpller proportion of labor to available land and capi.tal. Although ~pital
was scarce in the New waid, land was not. The scarce factor was labor, whach was well paad as a
result.
9. HARRY ScHEIBER ET AL., AMERICAN EcONOMIC HISTORY 13 (1976).
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~d the quality of labor. 10 Here again, the United States has been fortu~~e. U.S. openness to experimentation and innovation has been credited

wilh placing the country at the technological forefront by the end of
World War I. 11 That lead accelerated until the diffusion of technology in
r~ent decades caused much of that lead to dissipate. 12 As for the quality
of labor, in spite of numerous persistent and seemingly intractable
problems, such as poverty and discrimination, the levels of education and
physical health of the U.S. worker have remained high throughout the
nation's history. 13 Once again this translated into higher wages and a
higher standard of living for American workers than for their foreign
counterparts.
The economic history of the United States is largely a story of rapid
growth, with the country sustaining rapid population and long-term per
capita income increases over most of its history. 14 That history has had a
profound influence on U.S. society and politics. It created a society with
a broad middle class, a republic in which the average American had a
stake in the status quo and was optimistic about the future because of the
likely prospect of continued economic growth. 15
10. See generally EDWARD DENNISON, TRENDS IN AMERICAN GROWTH, 1929-82 (1982);
Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. EcoN. & STAT.
312 (1957).
11. NATHAN ROSENBERG & L. BIRDZELL, How THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD 211-41 (1986).
12. MICHAEL DERTOUZOS ET AL., MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE COMPETITIVE
EDGE 23-25 (1993).
13. ScHEIBER ET AL., supra note 9, at 11. Although standardized test scores fell from 1966
through 1979, they have been rising since 1979 and have returned to their 1966level. John Bishop,
Achievement, Test Scores and Relative Wages, in WORKERS AND THEIR WAGES, supra note 4, at

146.
14. For example, between 1920 and 1970, real per capita income in the United States increased
by 250% and the mean American income was 60 percent above that of other developed nations.
SCHEIBER ET AL., supra note 9, at 7.
15. KEVIN PHILLIPS, BOILING POINT: REPUBLICANS, DEMOCRATS, AND THE DECLINE OF
MIDDLE-CLASS PR.OSPER.ITY 14-15 (1993). Study after study shows that the wealthy received a
disproportionate share of income gains in the 1980s. Eg., Kosters, supra note 4; LEVY & MICHEL,
supra note 4; Congressional Budget Office, House Ways and Means Committee, Overview of Entitlement Programs ("Green Book") 1521 (1992). The data describe two phenomena. The first is a
sharp slowdown in the rate of income growth beginning in 1973. For example, disposable income
per full-time worker increased by 2.45% a year from l947 through 1973 but by only 0.67% a year
from 1973 through 1988. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1333 n.l. The second is an acceleration
in earnings inequality. Id. at 1343-45 & Table 2 (twenty-two series of inequality, compiled by seven
groups of authors, for all earners, men and women, showing increasing inequality over portion of
1980s examined). The 1980s, which exhibited slow growth in average (both mean and median) and
income with .increased variation around that average, increased the ranks of the poor and the
wealthy while the ranks of the middle class decreased. /d. at 1333; John Bound & George Johnson,
Wages in the United States During the 1980s and Beyond, in WORKERS AND THEIR WAGES, supra
note 4, at 77, 77-80. But see RICHARD McKENZIE, THE "FORTUNATE FIFTH" FALLACY 18-19
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CONSEQUENCES OF A GLOBAL ECONOMY

The integration of the United States into the global economy has
occurred rapidly. Between 1950 and 1980, the share of U.S. gross
national product ("GNP") involved in international trade increased
nearly tenfold, from two percent to almost twenty percent. 16 Trade is
not the only way in which the United States has become integrated into
the &}obal economy. There are also closer ties through capital flow and
tec~ology transfer; these are increasingly operating not just from the
United States to foreign countries but also from foreign countries to the
United States.
The economic consequences of U.S. integration in the global economy are profound. A global market for goods gives U.S. consumers
more choices and lower prices. Although it provides jobs in export
industries and eliminates jobs in import-competing industries, the net
change is approximately zero. With job loss and job creation approximately equal, the frequently debated and highly contentious issue of the
total number of jobs is a red herring. 17 The underlying issues are distributive-who has the jobs and at what wages-because globalization can
have a dramatic impact on wages, especially relative wages, within the
economy.
The first economic principle that must be understood is that the
movement of goods, like the movement of workers, tends to reduce crossborder wage differences. In effect, the cross-border movement of goods
places workers in different countries in competition with one another. 18
For example, because steel is produced in the United States and in South
Korea, trade restrains how much higher U.S. steelworker wages can be
than those of their South Korean counterparts. If U.S. wages in the steel
industry were too high, U.S. steel would not be able to compete with
South Korean steel that would, as a result, pour into the United States
and other countries. This would lead to a decline in U.S steel production
and a loss of jobs in the domestic steel industry. Thus, in a global market
(Ctr. for the Study of Am. Business Policy Study No. Ill, 1992) (arguing that incomes of all quintiles grew over the 1980s, but the rate of growth was the greatest for the highest quintile).
16. JOHN BARTON & BART FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 23 (1986).
17. Cf. EDWARD GRAHAM 8t PAUL KRUGMAN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 60-62 (2d ed. 1991) (making a similar argument about foreign investment).
18. One way to state this idea is to recognize that trade in goods can substitute for factor
mobility. See WILFRED J. ETHIER, MODERN INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMICS 110 (2d ed. 1988).
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the wages of steelworkers in the United States and South Korea cannot
be determined independently. 19
A second way in which globalization reduces cross-border wage differences is through the diffusion of technology. Three decades ago U.S.
commercial technology was unsurpassed. However, since then much of
the U.S. technological lead has vanished. The availability of comparable
technology around the world tends to equalize worker productivity,
reducing cross-border wage differences among similarly skilled
workers. 20
Globalization has also reduced the capital abundance advantage of
the United States. At the end of World War II, Europe and Asia were in
ruin. Their plants were destroyed, their capital base depleted. U.S.
workers had much more capital with which to work than did their foreign counterparts, raising both their productivity and their standard of
living relative to that of their foreign counterparts. 21 However, since
then, foreign countries have been rebuilt. Furthermore, capital is now
highly mobile internationally, moving rapidly to seek the highest returns.
Thus, the U.S. advantage from more abundant capital has lessened. 22
The integration of the United States into the world market does not
affect all workers equally. Globalization is raising the wages of highly
skilled U.S. workers and reducing the wages of less skilled U.S. workers.
This occurs because relative to the rest of the world, the United States
has an abundance of highly educated workers. Consequently, integration
places the highly skilled and highly educated segment of the population
into a pool with relatively few highly skilled and highly educated people,
thereby raising their wages. Similarly, integration places the less skilled
and less educated segment of the population into a global pool with an
abundance of less skilled and less educated workers, thereby lowering
19. The conclusion that wages will not be determined independently in each country does not
imply that wages in the two countries wiii be equal. Wages can differ to the extent that transportation costs or import restraints raise prices in one country. Wages can also differ to the extent that
worker productivity differs between countries. PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NoRDHAUS,
EcONOMICS 680-81 (14th ed. 1992). Productivity will differ to the extent that workers in one country are more skilled or their country has superior technology or resource endowments, or capital is
relatively more abundant.
20. See Robert Z. Lawrence, The International Dimension, in AMERICAN LIVING STANDARDS: THREATS AND CHALLENGES 23, 25 (Robert E. Litan eta). eds., 1988).
21. Thus, for example, until the early 1970s, U.S. production line workers enjoyed higher living standards than U.K. branch bank managers or German supervisors. PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at
30.
22.

See EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 31 (Jan. 1989).
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their wages. Because the global pool has relatively more unskilled workers than does the U.S. pool, integration is raising the relative wages of
skilled workers in the United States. 23 Thus, integration, which tends to
reduce cross-border differences in wages among similarly skilled workers, 24 has caused the real wages of the highly skilled portion of the U.S.
workforce to rise and those of the less skilled and unskilled portions to
fall. 25 The effect is just the opposite for workers in the rest of the world.
Globalization reduces the relative wages of the highly skilled portion of
the foreign workforce and raises the wages of the less skilled or unskilled
portions. 26
The disparate impact of globalization on highly skilled and less
skilled U.S. workers is well-supported. The data indicate that over the
1980s there was a substantial increase in demand for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. 27 Part of this shift in demand can be attributed
to trade flows that have reduced the number of manufacturing jobs, the
traditional high-wage employer of less-educated men. 28 However, this
cannot be the complete explanation because declines in demand for lesseducated workers have also occurred within industries. 29 Recent years
have also seen much non-neutral technological change, increasing
the productivity of highly skilled workers more than that of less-skilled
and eliminating many middle-class jobs. 30 It has been . argued that
globalization plays a role in forcing firms to implement such non-neutral
23. One way to see this is to recognize that wages are detennined by the demand and supply of
labor. Increased trade, especially increased imports of goods that intensively use low-skilled labor,
reduces demand for such labor, thereby lowering wages. Also the movement offshore of much manufacturing pushes many of these workers into the nontraded sector, increasing competition and
reducing wages.
24. In the international economics literature, this is called the factor-price equalization theorem. This theorem states the following for a two country, two good model: "Free international trade
between two countries will cause factor prices in the countries to become more equal. If both countries continue to produce both goods with free trade, their factor prices will actually be equal."
ETHIER, supra note 14, at 109.
25. See PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 173; Lester Thurow, The Disappearance of the Middle
Class, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1987, § 3, at 3; George Borjas et al., On the Labor Market Effects of
Immigration and Trade (1990), cited in Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1359 & n.73.
26. At least this is what theory suggests. If so, globalization might reduce global income inequality while increasing U.S. income inequality.
27. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1371-72.
28. /d. at 1372. The influence of trade on wages is reflected in the changing composition of
trade. See Murphy & Welch, supra note 4, at 60-61. It is also reflected in the shift of operation
abroad. See Bound & Johnson, supra note 15, at 97-101; Marvin H. Kosters, Foreword, in WoRKERS
AND THEIR WAGES, supra note 4, at xi-xii.
29. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1372.
30. /d. at 1362.
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technological changes because increased foreign competition increases
the pressure to improve efficiency. 31

IV. CONFLICTING RESPONSES

I

Globalization has not so much created new conflicts as it has intensified existing conflicts. At the broadest level of generality, globalization
drives a wedge between the concepts of economic efficiency and domestic
income equality. Although the conflict between these two values predates the integration of the U.S. economy into the world economy,
globalization exacerbates this conflict. 32 Globalization raises the cost to
the nation of using the government's traditional economic policy tools,
such as tariffs and quotas. On the other hand, the increased inequality
brought about by globalization strengthens the fairness argument for
intervention. 33 The results are increased tension, animosity and acrimonious public debate. 34
There are two standard responses to the dislocations caused by
imports. One response is to allow the dislocations to occur and to permit
the dislocated workers and capital to be absorbed by growing sectors of
the economy. The second response is to preserve jobs and profits by
restricting imports of the threatening merchandise. 35 Such restrictions
take ~ variety of forms including tariffs, 36 quotas, 37 voluntary restraint
31. /d. at 1369.
32. The conflict between efficiency and equality brought about by globalization arises only if a
national perspective is taken. Looked at globally, globalization reduces inequality, so there is no
conflict. This raises the question of what perspective to take for normative analysis: the national
perspective or the global one.
33. Using a different vocabulary, the conflict can be described as one between individual autonomy and community.
34. The manifestations have been documented by PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 223.
35. The United States has restricted imports of steel and textiles, among other items. See
JAMES BoVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD: HOW CONGRESS PILLAGES THE CONSUMER AND DEC·
IMATES AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 35-59, 76-92 (1991).
36. A tariff is a tax levied on imports only. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT'') limits a nation's right to raise tariffs. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, art. II, T.I.A.S. No. 1700. Countries frequently ignore their obligations, such as the United
States did in the 1960s when it raised the tariff on trucks to twenty-five percent in a dispute with
Europe over U.S. chicken exports. The recent battle over whether to apply punitive tariffs to Japanese minivans was an attempt to protect the domestic auto industry. See BOVARD, supra note 35, at
31.
.
37. A quota is a quantitative restriction on imports. The United States has country-by-country
quotas on sugar. David Tarr & Morris Morkre, Aggregate Costs to the United States of Tariffi and
Quotas on Imports, in THE NEW PROTECTIONIST THREAT TO WORLD WELFARE 221-23 (Dominick
Salvotore ed., 1987).
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agreements ("VRAs"), 38 orderly marketing agreements, 39 as well as
nontariff barriers ("NTBs"). 40
The debates over these measures are frequently bitter. 41 The stakes
are large, not only monetarily but also in terms of human suffering and
individual dignity. The dilemma arises because globalization injures
some workers and increases the harm to the nation as a whole from the
intervention that would alleviate the injury to those directly and
adversely affected.
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A.

THE CASE FOR TRADE POLICY
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The harmful adjustments brought about by globalization are concentrated on the poorer members of society. Globalization puts people
out of work, reduces the wages of many by pushing them from the manufacturing to the service sector, and swells the ranks of those living in
poverty. By accelerating income inequality at a time of little income
growth, globalization raises the specter of the United States becoming a
two-class society with only rich and poor. Such a possibility is not only
terribly frightening for the poor, it is anathema for most Americans.
38. These are agreements by foreign governments to limit exports at the request of the U.S.
government. VRA's are often undertaken under the threat of trade restrictions. The agreement by
the government of Japan to limit annual car exports to the United States to 1.68 million vehicles a
year is the most well-known. Id. at 220-21.
39. The best known example is the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, under which the United States
restricts textile imports from forty countries. BoVARD, supra note 35, at 36.
40. Because of the success of GATI in reducing tariffs and restricting the use of quantitative
restrictions, protectionist pressures frequently surface through NTBs, which are comprised of a variety of policies that burden imports. Among the most colorful of these are Japan's insistence on
checking tulip bulbs for disease by cutting their stems vertically down the middle, and France's
insistence in the early 1980s requirement that all videocassette recorders be imported through one
small, inland, and understaffed custom-house. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 69 (1988);
David White, Poitien Keeps Video Invaders at Bay with Gallic Sangfroid, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992,
§ 1, at 1. More common and more controversial are import restrictions based on environmental or
health concerns. For example, is an EC prohibition on beef treated with a growth hormone commonly used in the United States designed to protect the health of EC consumers or the purses of EC
ranchers? Similarly, is the move to restrict U.S. imports of Mexican goods, the manufacture of
which pollutes the Mexican environment, intended to protect the Mexican environment? Such
measures pose the conftict between legitimate domestic regulatory ends and impermissible protection
for domestic industries.
41. The parties in these disputes play for keeps and have long memories. A former chairwoman of the U.S. International Trade Commission and friend of the Clintons was prevented from
becoming U.S. Trade Representative because of her work on behalf of U.S. steel users in unsuccessfully opposing extension of steel VRAs in 1989. See Keith Bradsher, The Transition: Democratic
Rifts May Hurt Clinton on Foreign Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, § 1, at 1; John Maggs, Stern
and Bergsten Vie for Deputy USTR Post, J. CoM., Jan. 13, 1993, at A1; Asra Q. Nomani & Bob
Davis, Trade-Post Fight Rates High on Meanness Meter As Faxes Fault ·a Contender's Support for
U.S., WALL STREET J., Dec. 1, 1992, at Al.
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Unemployment and lower wages force people to reduce their living
standards. But it does more-it threatens their sense of self. For many
Americans much of their identity is tied to their jobs and to their ability
to provide for their families. Job loss and reliance on public assistance or
charity can be devastating. Protecting domestic industries permits these
people to keep their jobs, provide for their families, remain productive,
and stay off the dole.
Those suffering will not only be displaced adults but their children
as well. The children, of course, are innocent victims, but so are the
adults. Many never had the opportunity to attain the skills that could
have led to higher paying jobs. Even those who chose not to pursue the
high skills path did not anticipate what has happened. They entered the
workforce, whether in the manufacturing or service sector, with the
anticipation of secure and steady employment and confident of maintaining their middle-class lifestyles. The world threw them a curve. Of
course, not all expectations are entitlements and not all harms can be
alleviated. Even so, when the result is that the rich get richer and the
poor get poorer, we cannot sit idly by and do nothing to alleviate the
suffering.
Furthermore, given the positive correlation between the education,
status, and income of parents and their children,42 the negative repercussions threaten to continue for a long time. The evil is exacerbated by a
national history of racial and ethnic oppression that denies equal opportunities to a large share of the population. Accordingly, to lock in the
status quo is to perpetuate earlier and continuing wrongs.

B.

THE CASE AGAINST TRADE POLICY

Import restrictions are the traditional tool for protecting domestic
workers from the harmful effects of international trade. By raising prices
import restrictions harm consumers and downstream producers. Not
only are such policies inefficient, 43 they are difficult to justify on distributive grounds. Because the poor spend a larger share of their income than
the rich, the impact of higher prices is greater on the poor. In addition,
workers for downstream producers are harmed by import restrictions.
They stand to lose their jobs or see their incomes fall and are presumably
as deserving as workers in import-competing industries. Furthermore,
because import restrictions also reduce exports, such restrictions will
42. Edward B. Fiske, Education: Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, at BlO.
43. They are. When harm is measured in terms of willingness to pay, the bann to consumers
exceeds the gains to the protected workers and capital .
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reduce jobs in the export sector. 44 The individuals who are directly and
adversely affected by globalization are easy to identify; those hurt by
slowing or reversing globalization are harder to identify but their injuries
are no less real nor are they any less worthy.
Trade policy intervention is also shortsighted. A nation's standard
of living ultimately depends on what it produces. Saving workers' jobs
keeps them in industries where they are relatively less productive and
prevents them from moving to jobs where they are more productive. The
gain to the nation is the savings in short-term transition costs. The harm,
however, persists indefinitely, as long as the industries continue to operate inefficiently. In a 1984 monograph, David Tarr and Morris Morkre
estimated that the one-time adjustment costs from removing all tariffs45
and quantitative restrictions on automobiles, sugar, textiles, 46 and steel
would be $380 million. The annual benefits would be $9.29 billion,
nearly twenty-five times as large. Moreover, although the costs would be
incurred only once, the benefits would continue indefinitely. Expressed
differently, the annual cost to the nation for each job saved in the steel
industry is $81,700 whereas each job saved in the auto industry costs
$225,000 annually. 47
Globalization has also changed the· mix of imports and exports.
Increasingly international trade is in intermediate goods, such as semiconductors and steel, which upstream producers provide to downstream
producers in order to make final goods, such as personal computers and
cars. The rapid expansion of trade in intermediate goods has occurred
because globalization rationalized the production process for many
goods. 48
The increasing importance of trade in intermediate goods further
hampers the ability of policymakers to use the traditional tools of trade
policy to protect jobs and industries. This is because raising the price of
an intermediate good will reduce the competitiveness of downstream producers. Without foreign competition the higher input price leads to an
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44. Before the Civil War, the import-competing industrial North favored higher tariffs; the
exporting agricultural South favored lower tariffs. The Southerners understood that higher tariffs
would reduce demand for their exports. JOHN DOBSON, TWO CENTURIES OF TARIFFS: THE BACK·
GROUND AND EMERGENCE OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 49-56 (1976).
45. The mean tariff was 3.7 percent ad valorem. Tarr & Morkre, supra note 37, at 218.
46. They considered only restrictions on textiles from Hong Kong, the largest foreign supplier
of textiles to the United States. /d. at 223-25.
47. /d. at 221, 226.
48. See William H. Branson, Trends in United States International Trade and Investment Since
World War 1/, in THE AMERICAN EcONOMY IN TRANSITION 183, 221-31 (1980).
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increase in price and a fall in output at the next stage of production.
However, with international competition in the downstream product
market, the higher domestic price for the downstream product will result
in increased imports. The price of the final product will not increase as
much, but domestic production of the downstream product will fall further. A good example of this phenomenon is the semiconductor arrangement between the United States and Japan, which, by raising the price of
semiconductors in the United States, has been blamed for reducing the
competitiveness of the semiconductor-intensive U.S. computer
industry. 49
C.

OTHER ISSUES

The tendency for globalization to intensify debate is not limited to
questions of trade policy. It influences the debate over a wide range of
issues that pit economic incentives against equality. For example, the
recently enacted family leave bill 50 illustrates this conflict. Proponents
argued that the bill was needed to protect workers who could not take
time off from work to care for ill family members or newborn children
for fear oflosing their jobs. 51 Opponents, in contrast, argued that the bill
would hurt business and ultimately workers by requiring that businesses
keep jobs open for those on leave for prolonged periods of time. 52 The
debate was intensified by global competition. Globalization made the
need for a family leave bill more pressing because declining wages have
forced many to enter the workforce to make ends meet. 53 On the other
hand, globalization raised the costs of burdening business, because the
additional burden would allow foreign competitors to increase exports
further reducing domestic production. 54
The family leave bill is not the only debate affected by globalization.
Debate over a legion of redistributive issues and social programs has
49. Because Japanese computer companies could obtain semiconductors more cheaply than
their U.S. counterparts, they made substantial gains on their counterparts. ARTHUR DENZAU,
TRADE PROTECTION COMES TO SILICON VALLEY 3-6 (Ctr. for the Study of Am. Business Formal
Publication No. 86, 1988).
SO. The family leave bill requires employers of 50 or more persons to provide their employees
with up to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave to care for a family member or because of
their own illness. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993).
S 1. Pros cf Cons: Should Congress Override the Veto of the Family and Medical Leave Act?, 72
CoNG. DIG. 14, 14 (1993) (comments of Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT)) [hereinafter Pros &
Cons].
52. /d. at 31 (comments of Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA)).
53. See PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 101.
54. Pros & Cons, supra note 51, at 15 (comments of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT).
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intensified. The conflict results from the increased need for help and the
in<~reased cost of providing that help through regulation.
Income inequality increased by globalization will also exacerbate
existing tensions in preferential hiring and admission programs. Widening income inequality raises the value of being admitted to a prestigious
school or of getting a prized job. It thus raises the stakes of affirmative
action: The beneficiaries stand to gain more and those who feel wrongly
excluded stand to lose more. Given the divisive views that already exist,
raising the stakes will make a consensus harder to reach and the debate
more volatile.
One possible response to the increased income inequality brought
about by globalization is to reverse the impact through redistributive
income taxes. Economists widely recognize that such a response is less
disruptive than trade restrictions because it interferes less with individuals' production and consumption choices. 55 Although tax policy is less
disruptive than trade policy, it is still disruptive. 56 In order to reverse the
income allocative effects of globalization, the tax burden on lower
bracket individuals will have to be reduced and the burden on higher
bracket individuals will have to be increased. In short a more progressive
tax regime would be necessary. 57 Although it is obvious that a more
progressive tax regime would reduce income inequality, it is also true
that greater progressivity would increase the disruption imposed by the
tax system. 58 For example, a more progressive income tax schedule
would blunt the economy's signal to those choosing careers by raising the
wages of less productive employment and reducing those of more productive employment. 59 These and other social tensions exacerbated by
globalization are likely to manifest themselves in economically diverse
areas where winners and losers are close together, like Los Angeles.
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55. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 19, at 687.
56. /d.
57. The point is not simply that a progressive income tax schedule instead of a flat one would
be necessary, but that globalization makes a more progressive tax schedule necessary to achieve the
same distribution of after-tax income.
58. See RICHARD MUSGRAVE & PEGGY MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 284 (5th ed. 1989).
59. The conftict between improving investment incentives and reducing economic inequality
are illustrated in the debate over President Clinton's proposed tax reforms. See Nobelists Rate
Clintonomics, WALL STREET J., March 23, 1993, at A14.
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V. CONSEQUENCES FOR AMERICAN BELIEFS
Like every country, the United States has a culture of secular beliefs.
Some are more myth than reality; others are more real. Whether mostly
fact or fiction, these beliefs developed over many years when the U.S.
economy was more isolated than it is today. These beliefs are important
for several reasons. They define who we are: We are a nation with a
broad middle class. They also inform our expectations: The standard of
living of each succeeding generation exceeds that of preceding generations. Frequently, the basis for the belief is forgotten by the public,
which only remembers the belief. Unfortunately, globalization has
eroded the economic conditions upon which many of these beliefs are
based. The impact of globalization on these beliefs is described below.
The consequences for some of these beliefs are obvious. As a result
of stagnant income growth, Americans are no longer confident that their
lives will be materially richer than those of their parents. 60

'i

Globalization is also changing the picture of America as a nation
with a broad and growing middle class. Statistics cited at the beginning
of this Essay61 underscore a threat to the existence of a broad middle
class. "Middle class" is not a statistical concept, defined by a relative
position in a distribution, but a standard of living. It is the ability to
afford the basic items of a middle-class lifestyle. 62 Defined this way, most
Americans view themselves as part of the middle class. However, the
number that can maintain that lifestyle has been falling. 63
A.

II

THE ROAD TO THE GOOD LIFE

In the United States, which has a large portion of highly educated
people and many of the best educational institutions in the world, an
education has long been viewed as a path to the middle class and beyond.
Even so, education has not been viewed as the only road to the American
Dream of a middle class lifestyle. One could enjoy that lifestyle without
attending college. The worker with a small suburban house, a car or two
in the driveway, and perhaps a boat, is part of the post-World War II
American landscape.
60. PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 167-92.
61. See supra notes 4, 5, & 15.
62. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1338.
63. Phillips, supra note 15, at 3.
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Although college is not the guarantee of success that it once was, the
CO!it of not going to college has increased. 64 Because of globalization,
which tends to place workers around the world with similar skills into
the! same pool for wage determination, fewer U.S. workers are able to
afford a middle-class lifestyle. 65 The reduced opportunities for low
skilled workers to enjoy a middle-class lifestyle forecloses one road to the
middle class: finish high school, keep your nose clean, and get a good job.
It is no longer enough to slide through school without receiving either a
basic or vocational education. Instead, workers will need to have more
skills, whether learned in school or on the job, to achieve a middle-class
lifestyle. 66
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NATION OF IMMIGRANTS
I

I

No country but the United States could have as an icon the Statute
of Liberty with the inscription from Emma Lazarus: "Give me your
tired, your poor, your huddled masses . . . ." For most Americans,
including the author, the United States provided our poor ancestors with
an. opportunity to make a better life. Without that opportunity many of
us might never have been born or would be living in harsh and oppressive
conditions. Although there have always been some Americans who want
1to curtail immigration severely to keep out others who are different,
:many find troubling the thought of denying others the opportunities our
ancestors were fortunate to have had.
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Although all the data are not yet in, many observers believe that
poorly educated, poorly skilled citizens and residents suffer most from
immigration. Because, relative to the existing population, the new immigrant population is less educated and has fewer marketable skills, 67
immigrants not only compete with similarly situated citizens and residents for jobs, but the additional labor tends to hold down wages for the
poor. 68 In contrast, the wealthy benefit from the inftux because highly
skilled workers and minimally skilled workers do not compete with each
64. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1356-57.
65. The squeeze comes about because higher wages would mean higher prices for domesticly
produced goods. However, foreign competition prevents prices from rising because demand for a
company's product would be sharply reduced. As a consequence, real wages fall, pushing many
workers out of the middle class and creating few opportunities for the next generation.
66. Between 1979 and 1987, the proportion of male high-school graduates between 25 and 34
who earned more than $20,000 (in 1988 dollars) fell from 57% to 46%. Levy & Murnane, supra
note 5, at 1353 n.60.
67. ld. at 1359 (citing Borjas et al., supra note 25).
68. See Bound & Johnson, supra note 15, at 83-84.

)

I

177

1614

!!I! 7 .

SOUTHERN CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1599

other for jobs. Instead, to the wealthy, minimally skilled immigrants are
an inexpensive source of labor providing services more cheaply.
Further restricting immigration would reduce the population of less
educated workers. As a result, the wages of less educated workers would
likely rise, and thereby their standard of living. It, of course, would be
desirable to improve living standards without further restricting immigration, but that might not prove feasible. If it is true that the poorly
educated bear most of the brunt of immigration, we are faCed with a
difficult choice between further restricting immigration and improving
the standard of living of the resident poor. 69
C.

A CLASSLESS SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY

Perhaps our most cherished secular myth is that the United States is
an egalitarian, classless society. A well known recent expression of this
myth was the statement by then-President Bush, a child of the upper
crust, that class and privilege belong to the Old World, not to the New. 70
Of course, class differences exist in the United States as they always
have. 71 Globalization did not create class differences, but it has been
widening the economic gap between classes. 72 Because growing economic inequality translates into lifestyle differences with fewer shared
experiences, globalization makes class differences more pronounced. It
also makes the U.S. class structure more rigid because the shrinkage in
middle-class jobs is reducing opportunities to join the middle class.
By exacerbating class differences, globalization is also threatening
our sense of community. The slow growth in per capita income and
widening income inequality create the perception that interests across
classes are no longer aligned. Of course, there have always been both
shared and divergent interests, but declining opportunity creates an environment in which people fearful of the future will grab what they can
now. It also creates the perception that what one consumes comes at the
expense of others. 73 Thus, because ethnic, racial, and religious ties are
69.

For a discussion of this issue in the context of the Los Angeles riots, see Jack Miles, Blacks

vs. Browns: African-Americans and Latinos, ATLANTIC, Oct. 1992, at 41.
70. Benjamin DeMott, The Myth of C/asslessness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1990, at A23.
71. For a description of the important role class plays in the United States, see BENJAMIN
DEMOTT, THE IMPERIAL MIDDLE: WHY AMERICANS CAN'T THINK STRAIGHT ABOUT CLASS
(1990).
12. For example, in 1989 the income share of the top one percent ofthe U.S. population rose
from 8.3 percent in 1977 to 13.0 percent, while that of the middle quintile fell from 16.3 percent to
14.7 percent. KEVIN PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 277.
73. For the classic statement of this proposition, see LESTER THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SociETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR EcONOMIC CHANGE ( 1980).
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strong, declining opportunity and slow economic growth encourage
polarization thereby weakening our community. 74 Moreover, the frictions between groups are likely to erupt in urban areas, such as Los
Angeles, with heavy concentrations of different racial, ethnic, and religious groups. 7s
D.

A STABLE DEMOCRACY BASED ON A STAKE FOR ALL

A notion related to the large American middle class is that our
republican form of government is supported by a population with a
strong interest in national policies. A stable democratic government can
only be built around an informed citizenry with a stake in society. The
key is the stake. It provides the incentive to be informed and the perception, if not the reality, of alignment of interest. It also introduces a certain conservatism, an opposition to fundamental change, that makes for
stable government. The fear is that if inequality continues to grow, stratification and polarization in the U.S. economy, by creating social and
political turmoil, will produce a chronically unstable government. 76
VI.

NEW THINKING: HIGH-SKILLS STRATEGY

The need to ameliorate the suffering caused by globalization and the
realization that traditional trade policy instruments have many harmful
side effects have forced policymakers to look elsewhere for solutions.
The realization that in the long run a society's standard of living is determined by its level of productivity has led many observers to conclude
that the way to raise living standards is to raise worker productivity by
improving workers' skills. 77 Although recognizing that a more skilled
workforce could ameliorate the harms from globalization is easy, achieving that result is not.
The prospects for improving the skill of existing workers and future
workers differ. Existing workers who have lost their jobs because of
changing global trade patterns have a variety of retraining programs
available to them. Unfortunately, however, these programs have poor
track records, insufficiently compensating workers for their lost income
and actually delaying adjustment by discouraging workers from taking
74. "Ethnic, racial and religious tensions in the United States have typically accompanied hard
times as individuals and groups worry about lost jobs, declining incomes and competition for scarce
rewards." PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 237.
75. See id. at 236-44.
76. Thurow, supra note 25, at 3. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 1-81.
77. See The Global Economy: Who Gets Hurt, supra note 3, at 48.
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new jobs at lower wages. 78 Although these programs have a lot of room
for improvement, it is unreasonable to expect that most displaced workers will find new· jobs at their old wages. Even with a vastly improved
adjustment assistance program, many will only be able to find jobs at
reduced wages.
Future workers provide cause for both optimism and concern. The
reason for optimism is because it is easier to train than to retrain, and
with many more working years ahead of those not yet in the workforce,
education and training are better investments for both them and society.
Thus there is a good opportunity to provide individuals not yet in the
workforce with the necessary skills. The reason for concern is the dire
state of public education. 79 Moreover, because primary and secondary
education programs last twelve years, it is unlikely that the economic
trends can be reversed soon, even if education is improved immediately.
The threat facing the United States is not only economic stagnation
but a continuing trend of slow economic growth and widening income
inequality. Unless we create a more productive workforce, from the
skilled to the unskilled, there may come a day when the United States
has a somewhat larger elite, a much smaller middle class, and many more
poor. Unless these trends are reversed, the conflicts described in Section
IV will continue to intensify and the secular beliefs described in Section
V will be further challenged. 80
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is much in the Los Angeles riots of 1992 that is unique to
African-Americans. There are, however, other aspects that cut across
racial lines. Among the most important of these are the economic challenges and frustrations facing less educated Americans. These frustrations show no signs of abating. They are in part caused by powerful
global forces and are likely to continue. The globalization of the U.S.
I!
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78. ROBERT LAWRENCE
APPROACH 52 (1986).

& ROBERT LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE: A PRAGMATIC

79. In spite of the large amounts spent on primacy and secondary education, U.S. students lag
behind their foreign counterparts in math and science. PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE
TwENTY-FIRST CENTuRY 305-07 (1993).
80. The need to encourage investment and training suggests another possible conflict-between
initiative and compassion. Although these two values are not contradictory, in a world of sound
bites and simple messages they might not coexist easily. It becomes too easy to confuse the results of
a lack of initiative with those of ill fortune or discrimination. The myth that the United States is a
classless society causes many people to attribute incorrectly lack of success to personal failings
. instead of to class-based hurdles. See DEMOTT, supra note 70.
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economy has reduced the market demand in ~he United States for
unskilled and marginally skilled workers, driving down the incomes of
the less educated segment of the population, forcing some out of the middle class, and making it more difficult for others to lead a middle-class
lifestyle. Thus, unless the skill level of the less educated segment of the
U.S. population is significantly improved, globalization threatens to further erode living standards and exacerbate wealth differences. If so, such
violence will become more common. 81 Although the threat is greatest in
minority communities, no portion of the nation is immune. 82

On an abstract level, globalization highlights the clash between two
competing groups of policy norms, those relating to economic efficiency
and those relating to fairness, as measured from a domestic perspective. 83
Perhaps because globalization is primarily an economic process, the economic consequences of globalization have been more thoroughly studied
than its social and political ramifications. Of course, integration into a
global marketplace has important consequences for U.S. society above
and beyond what it means for the U.S. economy. This Essay raises some
of these noneconomic consequences; they deserve more attention.
More generally, this Essay illustrates a commonly observed phenomenon: Neither normative nor positive analysis alone can generate
useful policy prescriptions. Normative analysis focuses on the question
of what should be done; positive analysis on the constraints on what can
be done. To meet the challenges ahead, it will be necessary to draw on
both normative and positive analyses.

81. Robin Wright of the Los Angeles Times argues that the Los Angeles riots are part of a
global trend towards greater urban violence because of decreasing opportunities available to the
urban poor. Robin Wright, LA. Riots Called Symptom of Worldwide Urban Trend, L.A. TIMES,
May 2!1, 1992, at Al.
82. This point was made by Bill Clinton as a presidential candidate. Arsenio Hall Show (television broadcast, June 3, 1992).
83. Looking at globalization from an international perspective cautions against reversing the
trend of rising domestic inequality in ways that would increase global inequality. Thus, restrictions
on trade, capital flows, and technology transfer are likely to be normatively undesirable because of
their harmful international effects. A global perspective would also caution against tightening immigration, even if such a restriction benefitted the poorest Americans, because of the harm to even
poorer immigrants. Such a perspective might also place little value on weakening the sense of an
American community, especially if the sense of a world community were strengthened.
There are two reasons for the indefiniteness expressed above. First, the analysis is static, not
dynamic. Second, there are other normative principles of entitlement besides reducing inequality
which require consideration.

